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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume LII February, 1950 Number 2
HEARSAY: "SELF-SERVING" DECLARATIONS
TiomAS P. HARDmAN*
Many West Virginia cases purport to deal with "self-serving"
declarations on the theory that there is a principle of Evidence
especially excluding such assertions; indeed, some cases seem to
assume that this supposedly special doctrine condemns the use of
such extrajudicial statements even though they come within one
of the exceptions to the hearsay rule or do not violate the rule.
For example, in Rowan v. Chenoweth,' in a dictum sometimes
cited as a precedent,2 the principle, as applicable to writings at least,
is referred to as a "fixed" doctrine, and, as if to make it not only
fixed but look fixed, it was stated in Latin and then liberally
translated. Said the court: "'Scriptura pro scribente nihil probat"
is a fixed maxim.3 'A party's self-serving declarations cannot be put
in evidence in his own favor whether he be living or dead at the
trial.' "4
On the other hand, there are many West Virginia decisions
admitting such declarations, usually with little or no mention of
the fact that they are self-serving. Accordingly it is the purpose of
this discussion to examine the more significant cases in point (some
Dean of the College of Law, West Virginia University.
49 W. Va. 287, 38 S. E. 544 (1901).
2 See, e.g., Reiser v. Lawrence, 96 W. Va. 82, 91, 123 S. E. 451, 455 (1924).
This case is hereafter explained in the body of this article in connection with
note 56.
3 The maxim, Scriptura pro scribente nihil probat (a writing proves nothing
in favor of the writer) seems to have been derived from the Roman law doctrine,
nullus idoneus testis in rea sua intelligitur (no witness is to be considered
suitable in his own behalf). See 2 WHARTON, EVIDENCE 1100, 1101 (1877), which
our court cites us an authority for the "fixed maxim" and for the interpretation.
Significantly, however, Wharton notes exceptions to the "rule".
4 At p. 292, 38 S. E. at 546. This statement is only a dictum for the reason
that the court went on to hold that the evidence did not come within the rule
as to an "entry made in due course of business"-an exception to the hearsay
rule. To support its decision, the court cited 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE §§120a,
120b, and 1 WHARTON, EVIDENCE §§681, 683 (1877), dealing with Regular Entries
Mhde in the Course of Business and with Party's Shopbooks as exceptions to the
hearsay rule.
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of them in the footnotesr) wyith a view to determine whether there
is such an exclusionary principle, or whether so-called self-serving
assertions are merely hearsay with a vituperative epithet, so that
the only rationale needed or pertinent in dealing with the problem
is to be found in the hearsay rule and its recognized exceptions, and
in the related doctrines as to when the hearsay rule does not apply."
Perhaps the case most commonly regarded as authoritative on
the general question in West Virginia is Scott v. Norfolk & Western
Ry.,7 in which the only point adjudicated by the court turned on
the admissibility of ceitain evidence which the court excluded,
purportedly on the sole basis that it was a self-serving statement.8
The court cited no precedent to support its ruling, but, relying
exclusively on Jones on Evidence, 2d ed.,9 laid down the following
proposition: "It is a general rule of broad application that self-
serving declarations are not admissible in behalf of the declarant." 10
Does the Scott case, however, or any other West Virginia
decision authoritatively enunciate any such special rule? If the
facts of the Scott case do not warrant such a sweeping proposition,
and if there are prior inconsistent West Virginia cases which are
not overruled, it would seem to follow, in accordance with well-
recognized principles of stare decisis, that the proposition is not the
real ratio decidendi of the case," at least if there are no prior
decisions authoritatively laying down such a doctrine. And if,
in addition, there are subsequent West Virginia decisions, not
overruled and inconsistent with such supposedly special doctrine,
5 See particularly notes 54 and 59 infra, in which several cases not com-
mented upon in the body of this article are briefly discussed. The list, however,
is not intended to be exhaustive as many of the judicial expressions are too
inconsequential to justify detailed examination.
6 Cf. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1765 (2d ed. 1923). As hereafter briefly
discussed in the body of this article, §1765 is omitted from the third edition.
But cf. 6 WIGMaoRE, EVIDENCE §1732 (3d ed. 1940).
r 104 W. Va. 461, 140 S. E. 329 (1927). In the latest West Virginia case in
point, Show v. Mt. Vernon Farm Dairy Products, 128 W. Va. 598, 37 S. E,2d 459
(1946), the only case cited by our court was the Scott case.
8 The court quoted with approval a passage from JONES, EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1908) which seems to refer to the argument sometimes made that to admit self-
serving declarations would permit a party to "make evidence for himself," i.e.,
manufacture evidence. This question-begging fallacy is dealt with in the body
of this discussion.
9 Section 895.
10 This statement, which is in the syllabus, is copied almost verbatim from
JONEs, EVIDENCE §895.
11 As to what constitutes the ratio decidendi of a case and how it is
determined, see GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw c. 2 (2d ed. 1929);
Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L. J. 161 (1930);
Hardman, Stare Decisis and the Modern Trend, 32 W. VA. L. Q. 163 (1926);
Hardman, The "Law" in West Virginia, 47 W. VA. L. Q. 23 (1940).
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may it not be concluded that the existence of such a doctrine in
this jurisdiction has been effectively negatived?
But before attempting to deduce a workable principle from
our seemingly inconsistent decisions, it is believed to be worth
while to bear in mind that, although at common law a party to an
action could not testify as he was disqualified because of interest,
today by statute he can testify on the stand in his own behalf,
except of course in regard to that limited class of situations as to
which the so-called Dead Man's statute applies.12  Quaere, then,
whether the supposedly special rule excluding self-serving declara-
tions is anything more than a die-hard survival of the now-abolished
common-law notion that a party's "interest" disqualifies him as
a witness. At any rate since he can now testify self-servingly on
the witness stand, why should his self-serving extrajudicial state-
ments be regarded as anything other than mere hearsay from the
point of view of admissibility as distinguished from weight? Of
course the fact that such statements are self-serving is a consideration
going to the weight of the evidence, just as the fact that a witness
on the stand is "interested" or otherwise biased is a matter affecting
the weight of his testimony. But, if the self-serving declaration
comes within some exception to the hearsay rule, should not such
declaration be regarded as hearsay, and nothing more, for purposes
of admissibility? And if, for any reason, such evidence does not
violate the hearsay rule, why should it be excluded?
An important decision in point is Stevens v. Friedman.13 In
that case, a civil action to recover damages for assault and battery,
the plaintiff offered her parents to testify as to statements made by
the plaintiff to her parents with respect to her then existing pain
and the effects of the injury sustained. That such statements are self-
serving is obvious. Yet our court held them to be admissible,
apparently on the ground-an undoubtedly sound one-that though
hearsay they come in under the exception for Declarations Evi-
dencing Physical or Mental Condition.14  The court, relying on
Greenleaf on Evidence15 and Wigmore on Evidence,16 and citing
12 See, e.g., Strode v. Dyer, 115 W. Va. 733, 117 S. E. 878 (1934), discussing
the West Virginia statute. See also Donley, Personal Transactions with Persons
Deceased at the Time of Trial, 41 W. VA. L. Q. 256 (1935).
13 58 W. Va. 78, 1 S. E. 132 (1906).
14 To sustain its conclusion, the court cites, inter alia, GRaNrAF, EVIDENCE
162b (16th ed. 1899) and 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1718 (1904), which treat such
admissibility as an exception to the hearsay rule.
15 See note 14 supra.
16 See note 14 supra.
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several out-of-state decisions, 7 said: "The weight of authority seems
to sustain the admissibility of this evidence in civil cases."1 8 And
as to this conclusion, there can be no doubt. 19 But how about
criminal cases? Are self-serving declarations ever admissible in
such cases in this jurisdiction?
Fortunately we have some criminal cases squarely in point.
For example, in State v. Abbott,20 a prosecution for murder in
which the defendant had shot the deceased and in which there was
an issue of self-defense, the circuit court had refused to permit the
defendant to prove his declarations made at the time of the shooting
and stating the reasons why he had shot the deceased. In holding
that it was error to refuse to admit these self-serving statements of
the accused, the court said, quoting with approval from a Georgia
case: 21 "In general, what a party says is not evidence in his favor
... but when the declarations of the party . . . " are a part of the
res gestae, "they are admissible." Significantly this case seems to
be the earliest West Virginia decision specifically dealing with the
admissibility of self-serving declarations, and interestingly the court
held them admissible. Interestingly, too, in a comparatively recent
case, State v. Baker,22 an indictment for receiving stolen goods, know-
ing them to be stolen, the circuit court had excluded a similar extra-
judicial statement on the ground that it was self-serving. Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court of Appeals, after noting the fact that the
evidence was self-serving, held the statement admissible as a part of
the res gestae. Said the court: "It matters not that the declaration
was evidence in his [the declarant's] favor." The actual conclusion
reached by our court in these cases is in accord not only with the
weight of authority but with sound principle. Of course, though,
the modern view is that such evidence is admissible under the ex-
ception to the hearsay rule known as Declarations Evidencing Phy-
sical or Mental Condition.2 Incidentally, in Corder v Talbott,24 per-
17 Kuney v. Dutcher, 56 Mich. 308, 22 N. W. 866 (1885); Towle v. Blake,
48 N. H. 92 (1868); Roosa v. Boston Loan Co., 132 Mass. 439 (1882).
18 58 W. Va. at 83, 51 S. E. at 134. To be sure, as the court painted out,
there are limitations to this exception.
19 See 6 WirMoRE, EVIDENCE §1718 et seq. (3d ed. 1940), collecting authorities
as to the exception in general.
20 8 W. Va. 741 (1875).
21 Monroe v. Georgiu, 5 Ga. 85 (1848).
22 84 W. Va. 151, 99 S. E. 252 (1919): accord, State v. Goldstrohm, 84 W. Va.
129, 99 S. E. 248 (1919). Here, too, there is a statement in the syllabus that such
declarations are admissible "both for and against" the declarant.
23 See 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1732 (3d ed. 1940).
24 14 W. Va. 277 (1878).
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haps the earliest West Virginia case purporting to exclude self-serv-
ing declarations and a case sometimes regarded as a precedent for
the proposition that such declarations are inadmissible, the court in
reality excluded the statements on the ground that they did not come
within the Res Gestae doctrine-an exception to the hearsay rule.
Moreover, what is more important, the court stated specifically
that such declarations of a party are admissible in his behalf if
they are a part of the res gestae. The reference to the evidence as
self-serving was therefore only a dictum. In other words, extra-
judicial self-serving assertions are admissible in West Virginia in
both civil and criminal cases if they come within this exception to
the hearsay rule.
To be sure, it is sometimes argued that to permit the introduc-
tion of self-serving declarations would allow a party to "make
evidence in his behalf." But as a recent Virginia case,25 in accord
with these West Virginia cases, ably answers this alleged reason,
such argument begs the question: it assumes that the statements
are false.2 6 In the Virginia case, Parsons v. Commonwealth,27 a
prosecution for murder, there was an issue as to whether the offense
constituted murder in the first degree or a homicide of a lesser
grade; and one question was whether the accused could offer his
extrajudicial assertion, made prior to the killing, that he was afraid
of the deceased. This hearsay is clearly self-serving, and the court
frankly conceded that it was. Yet the court admitted the evidence.
In a statement worthy of quotation the court said:
"While the cases [in point] are few, their logic is un-
answerable. Wigmore, that master of the subject, adheres
fully to this view. With trenchant phrase, apt illustration and
sound reason, he thus expresses himself:28 'To hold that every
expression of hatred, malice, and bravado is to be received,
while [no self-serving statement] no expression of fear, good-
will, friendship, or the like, can be considered, is to exhibit
ourselves the victims of a narrow whimsicality, which might
be expected in the tribunal of a Jeffreys, going down from
London to Taunton with his list of intended victims already
in his pocket ....But it was not to have been anticipated
in a legal system which makes so showy a parade of the pre-
sumption of innocence and the rights of the accused. This
question-begging fallacy about -"making evidence for himself"
25 Parsons v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 764, 121 S. E. 68 (1924).
20 See 3 WjG=ORE, EVIDENCE §1732 (2d. ed. 1923).
27 Cited supra note 25.
28 3 VIGMOR, EVIDENCE §1732 (2d ed. 1923).
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runs through much of the judicial treatment. There is no
reason why a declaration of an existing state of mind, if it
would be admissible against the accused, should not also be
admissible in his favor, except so far as the circumstances
indicate plainly a motive to deceive.' ",29
The reasoning of the Virginia court, and the actual conclusions
ieached in the above-mentioned West Virginia cases (apart from
the Scott case hereinafter to be discussed), seem so eminently sound
that it is difficult to understand how such evidence could be
excluded on the question-begging theory that the party must not
be allowed to "make evidence for himself."'0
Another enlightening illustration of admissible self-serving
declarations in this state is found in Starcher v. South Penn Oil
Co.,31 in which our court, relying largely on Wigmore, admitted
such evidence under the Spontaneous Exclamations exception to
the hearsay rule, alias Res Gestae in this jurisdiction..3 2  The
conclusion reached in this liberal decision is in accord with the
great weight of American authority although some out-of-state
cases seem to take a contrary view. 33  It should be pointed out
perhaps that in this particular decision the declarant was dead at
the time of the trial and the statement was offered by his adminis-
trator. But, as has already been noted, such an assertion is generally
regarded as coming within the supposed interdiction against self-
serving declarations. 34
Perhaps the most conspicuous examples of admissible self-
serving evidence are Parties' Shopbook Entries or Account Books
and, under certain circumstances, ordinary Business Entries. But
here, for some reason, such evidence even though self-serving is
admitted with little or no objection on that score, provided of
course that the entries fall within the recognized limitations to
the Shopbook doctrine and the Business Entries doctrine (so far
29 138 Va. 764, 780-781, 121 S. E. 68, 72.
30 And yet a few out-of-state courts have actually excluded such evidence.
See, citing some cases and discussing the point en passant, Note, 22 MINN.
L. REv. 391, 402 et seq. (1938). See also 6 WIGMOPE, EVIDENCE §1732 (3d. ed.
1940).
3' 81 W. Va. 587, 95 S. E. 28 (1918).
32 See, discussing the case, Hardman, Spontaneous Exclamations v. Res
Gestae, 25 W. VA. L. Q. 341 (1918).
33 See, e.g., Collins v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 122 W. Va. 171, 173, 8 S. E.2d
825 (1940). ("Spontaneity rather than contemporaneity is now the generally
recognized test of admissibility"); and see Note, 22 MINN. L. REv. 391, 402 et. seq.
(1938), discussing some contrary decisions.
34 See, e.g., Rowan v. Chenoweth, 49 W. Va. 287, 38 S. E. 544 (1901).
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as those doctrines are separable in this jurisdiction). "' Illustrative
West Virginia cases sanctioning the admission of such evidence are
cited in the accompanying footnote."6
Additional illuminating examples of admissible self-serving
declarations are to be found in the more or less companion cases
of High's Heirs v. Pancake3 7 and Wade v. McDougle.38  Between
them, these two cases deal with the general situation in which
under an issue of prescription by adverse possession there is a
question as to the admissibility of extrajudicial declarations by the
occupant of the property, importing a claim of title in himself. In
each of these cases our court, per Brannon, J., one of the greatest
of our West Virginia judges, ruled in favor of admissibility with
respect to two different aspects of the problem.3 9 And in the first
case Judge Brannon conceded in so many words that the declara-
tions were self-serving. The conclusion that such evidence is
admissible not only is general law throughout the United States
40
but is clearly sound for the reason that under an issue of prescription
by adverse possession such declarations, though made out of court,
not under oath, and not subject to cross-examination, are per se
an act of adverseness, " a verbal act," and therefore to admit them
does not violate the hearsay rule, for they are not offered to prove
the truth of the facts asserted therein,41 and the hearsay rule
excludes extrajudicial assertions only when they are tendered for
that purpose.42  In the first of these cases our court said: "Declara-
tions of one in actual possession of land, explanatory of the charac-
ter of his possession-that is, for instance, how he claimed, under
what title, and to what limits-are admissible." 43
Similarly a party's extrajudicial self-serving statements are ad-
missible when they are offered as being in and of themselves a part
35 See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1561, especially n. 5 (3d ed. 1940), indicating
that in the West Virginia cases the two doctrines are sometimes "hopelessly
confounded," citing e.g., Vinal v. Gilman, 21 W. Va. 301, 308 (1883). See also
cases cited in note 36 infra.
36 See, e.g., West Virginia Architects & Builders v. Stewart, 68 W. Va. 506,
70 S. E. 113 (1911); Motor Car Supply Co. v. Nicholas Hardware & Furn. Co.,
111 W. Va. 252, 161 S. E. 31 (1931); Dietz v. McVey, 77 W. Va. 601, 87 S. E. 926
(1916); Martufi v. Daniels, 99 NV. Va. 673, 129 S. E. 709 (1925).
37 42 W. Va. 602, 26 S. E. 586 (1896).
38 59 W. Va. 113, 52 S. E. 1026 (1906).
39 It should be noted that there are of course limitations to admissibility
in such cases. See 6 WIG oRE, EVIDENCE §§1772-1778 (3d ed. 1940).
40 Id. at § 1778 citing, inter alia, these two West Virginia cases.
41 See id. at §§1772-1778.
42 See id. at §1766.
43 This quotation is from the syllabus in High's Heirs v. Pancake, cited
supra note 37.
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of the terms of the legal transaction involved in the case, e.g., the
terms of an oral or written contract-a point, however, which is too
elementary to justify more than mere mention: normally one would
hardly expect an objection to such evidence as self-serving though
of course it is.44
Here, then, are several important cases admitting self-serving
declarations and decided prior to the Scott case. It should be
remembered, however, that in the Scott case, hereinafter to be
discussed in some detail, our court did not cite any of the above
considered cases, all of which are believed to be irreconcilable with
the special-rule theory purportedly enunciated in the Scott case.
Before proceeding further, it must be conceded that the sup-
posedly special rule of the Scott case somehow found its way into
that supposedly very special part of a West Virginia precedent, the
syllabus. This is hardly the time, however, to launch a prolonged
assault upon the redoubtable notion that the syllabus is the law
of the case in West Virginia, for the writer has heretofore ventured
a rather extended attack on that hardy idea in the pages of the
Law Quarterly.45 And yet, in order to guard against possible
misunderstanding, it seems desirable to recall, quite briefly, what
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals said and held in one
important case on that question.
In State v. Burnett,45 our court had written the following
syllabus:
"Dying declarations, being a substitute for sworn tes-
timony, must be such narrative statements as would be admis-
sible had the dying person been sworn as a witness. If they
relate to facts to which the declarant could have thus testified,
they are admissible." (Italics ours.)
In a later West Virginia case, State v. Graham,47 there was
offered in evidence a "dying declaration" importing that the dying
declarant and the accused had quarreled about a month before the
killing for which the accused was indicted. The State contended
that the evidence was admissible under the syllabus in the Burnett
case. The Supreme Court conceded in effect that this statement
44 That such evidence is admissible, see, e.g., Butts v. Butts, 81 W. Va. 55, 94
S. E. 360 (1917); 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1770 (3d ed. 1940).
45 See Hardnian, "The Law"-In West Virginia, 47 W. VA. L. Q. 23 (1940);
"The Syllabus Is the Law", 47 W. VA. L. Q. 141 (1941); "The Syllabus Is the
Law"--Another Word, 47 W. VA. L. Q. 209 (1941); "The Syllabus Is the Law"-
Another Word by Fox, J., 48 W. VA. L. Q. 55 (1941).
45 47 W. Va. 731, 35 5. E. 983 (1900).
47 94 W. Va. 67, 117 S. E. 699 (1923).
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in the syllabus, if law, would let the evidence come in. And the
lower court, perhaps on the ground that the syllabus is the law
in West Virginia, admitted the evidence. But the Supreme Court
held that it was error to admit it. Said the court:
"A careful examination of . . [the Burnett] case will
disclose that the language in the syllabus is broader than the
opinion warrants . . . The statement in the syllabus that 'If
they [the declarations] relate to facts to which the declarant
could have thus testified, they are admissible,' is too sweeping,
and taken apart from the facts stated in the opinion is in-
accurate. This statement would imply that . . . vanything he
[the declarant] might say in a dying declaration if he could
give it in evidence were he alive, would be competent evidence
upon a trial of the accused for his homicide. This is not the
law, and never has been in this state."48
Here, it should be noted, the West Virginia court in so many
words not only repudiated the syllabus of a case purporting to state
a proposition of law but repudiated it on the ground that the doc-
trine laid down in the syllabus was not the law, and never had been
in this state-that it never had been the law for the reason that the
syllabus was broader than the opinion warranted. Thus, in ulti-
mate analysis, the court found the law of the case, not in the sylla-
bus but elsewhere, and held, in'effect, that the prcposition set forth
in the syllabus, to the extent that it was too broad, was only a dic-
tum.
At this juncture it seems necessary to examine more fully the ac-
tual holding in the Scott case,49 which, as heretofore indicated, seems
to be regarded by some of our judges as the principal case on self-
serving declarations in this jurisdiction. In that case there was an
issue as to whether the plaintiff had been injured by lifting a heavy
steel rail, as the defendant claimed, or by being struck by the rail,
as the plaintiff claimed. The plaintiff offered in evidence a report
of the defendant's claim agent based upon an extrajudicial state-
ment by the plaintiff, made twenty-five days after the accident
causing the injury, to the effect that he (the plaintiff) had been
struck by the rail. The court held that the evidence was inadmis-
sible, and gave as its sole reason that the statement was a self-
serving declaration.
Does the Scott case, then, overrule the above-mentioned prior
decisions admitting self-serving declarations? Pretty obviously not,
48 At 71, 72, 117 S. E. at 700-701.
49 Cited supra note 7.
9
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partly for the reason that it was unnecessary in the Scott case to lay
down such a purportedly special rule, as the evidence was hearsay
not coming within any of the generally recognized exceptions. It is
submitted therefore that the sweeping proposition propounded in
the Scott case, being broader than the point to be adjudicated war-
ranted, and being inconsistent with many prior West Virginia cases,
is nothing more than an obiter dictum.
This conclusion seems to be strongly supported by a rather re-
cent decision by oui court in Wiseman v. Terry.50 In that case, in
which an eight-year-old child had been injured by an explosion in
connection with the operation of defendant's rock quarry, there was
an issue as to whether the defendant had used due care, or whether
there had been permission or invitation as charged in the declara-
tion. The evidence was that the defendant had instructed his fore-
man and all his employees not to allow children or others on or
about the operation. It was argued that such instructions, being
self-serving, were inadmissible under the rule of the Scott case. But
the court, distinguishing the Scott case, held the evidence admissi-
ble-a clearly sound result as such an extrajudicial utterance is of-
fered to evidence the state of mind which ensued in another person
in consequence of the utterance and therefore, not being offered to
prove the truth of any fact asserted, does not violate the hearsay
rule.51
Moreover, if the sweeping proposition propounded in the
Scott case is more than a dictum, how can the later West Virginia
case of Curfman v. Monongahela West Penn Public Service Co.5 2 be
satisfactorily explained? The Curfman case was an action for per-
sonal injury. The plaintiff called as a witness her physician who
had examined her. The physician testified as to several statements
made by the plaintiff and bearing upon the plaintiff's then physical
condition. These statements were unquestionably self-serving; and
the defendant claimed that they were inadmissible for that reason.
Nevertheless our court sanctioned the admission of the evidence,
saying, inter alia, that "Representations by a sick person of the na-
ture, symptoms and effects of the malady under which he was labor-
ing at the time . ..are ... admissible to establish the truth of
the matters communicated."53
50 111 W. Va. 620, 163 S. E. 425 (1932).
51 That such evidence does not violate the hearsay rule, see 6 WIGMoaz,
EviDENCE §1789 (3d ed. 1940) citing authorities.
52 113 W. Va. 85, 166 S. E. 848 (1932).
53 At 90, 166 S. E. at 850.
10
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The decision in the Curfman case is general law in the United
States, the evidence being admissible under the hearsay exception
for Declarations Evidencing Physical or Mental Condition; and,
since the Curfman case, a comparatively recent decision, has not
been overruled, it would seem that this case and the other above-
considered West Virginia decisions virtually explode the special-
rule theory. To be sure, there are West Virginia cases, not hereto-
fore discussed, which purport to exclude self-serving declarations; 4
but there seems to be no clear-cut decision which cannot be ex-
plained (as of the time of the decision55) without such supposedly
special doctrine, although it must be conceded that in a few in-
stances this supposed principle has been applied almost as if it were
a rule of thumb, the discussion being either too summary or eso-
teric to permit complete assurance as to just what the authoritative
holding of the case is. For example, in Reiser v. Lawrence-- the
excluded extrajudicial assertion was apparently banned by the hear-
say rule although the exact nature of the proscribed evidence was
not revealed by the court, except a pronouncement that it was "self-
serving"-such a case being of course practically worthless as a prece-
dent on the point herein considered.5 7 Also, in what seems to be
54 Illustrative cases are: Kinsley v. Monongalia County Court, 31 W. Va.
464, 7 S. E. 445 (1888) (evidence excluded by hearsay rule); Crothers' Adm'r
v. Crothers, 40 W. Va. 169, 20 S. E. 927 (1895) (dictum, as court held the witness
incompetent because of Dead Man's statute); Vale v. Suiter & Dunbar, 58 W. Va.
353, 52 S. E. 313 (1905) (hearsay: not part of the res gestae); Crawford v.
Workman, 64 W. Va. 19, 61 S. E. 322 (1908) (hearsay: not within any exception);
Jefferson v. Simpson, 83 W. Va. 274, 98 S. E. 212 (1919) (evidence excluded by
hearsay rule); State v. McKinney, 88 W. Va. 400, 106 S. E. 894 (1921) (hearsay:
not within res gesta exception); Depue v. Steber, 89 W. Va. 78, 108 S. E. 590
(1921) (evidence excluded because not within the res gestae exception; also some
"self-serving" evidence admitted "for the purpose of proving . .. mental con-
dition"); Farrar v. Goodwin, 98 W. Va. 215, 126 S. E. 922 (1925) (hearsay: not
within any exception); Sponaugle v. Warner, 98 W. Va. 532, 127 S. E. 403 (1925)
(same as last case); Carter v. Walker, 121 W. Va. 81, 1 S. E.2d 483 (1939)
(dictum, as court finally declared the declaration in effect irrelevant); Slater v.
United Fuel Gas Co., 126 W. Va. 127, 27 S. E.2d 436 (1943) (dictum; hearsay
not shown to be within any exception; court frankly conceded that the self-
serving statement was inadmissible as hearsay).
5 Some of the hearsay exceptions have been considerably broadened since
our court first began to condemn extrajudicial self-serving declarations. This
is particularly true as to the so-called res gestae doctrine under which many
self-serving statements have been admitted. See, e.g., Collins v. Equitable Life
Ins. Co., 122 IV. Va. 171, 173, 8 S. E.2d 825, 826 (1940) ("Spontaneity rather than
contemporaneity is now the generally recognized test of admissibility").
G0 96 W. Va. 82, 123 S. E. 451 (1924).
57 Moreover, the court seemed to indicate that the defendant's excluded
"self-serving" statement may have been irrelevant. Said the court (at page 91):
"and besides, we do not see how, with all his oral evidence in, he was prejudiced.
It would have shed no additional light on the real issues before the jury."
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the latest case on the-question, Show v. Mt. Vernon Farm Dairy
Products,5 8 the extrajudicial assertions condemned as "self-serving"
were offered to prove the truth of the facts asserted and were there-
fore excluded by the hearsay rule as they did not come within any
exception; 9 and interestingly our court cited only Jones on Evi-
dence, 2d ed., 0 and the Scott case. Moreover, Wigmore on Evi-
dence, in his first and second editions,"' categorically denies that
there is any such rule; and, in his latest voluminous and all but
authoritative edition, he does not seem to discuss the supposed rule
as such, although he does admit that there are some cases which
follow such a rule, purportedly at least.62  Significantly, too, Jones
on Evidence, 4th ed., considerably modifies the sweeping proposi-
tion set out in the second edition, and completely eliminates the
passage quoted by our court in the syllabus of the Scott case.
03
In arriving at the same conclusion as that reached by the West
Virginia court in the Curfman case, Judge Learned Hand, one of
America's greatest living jurists, speaking for a unanimous Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in United States v. Matot,84
has recently delivered what should be regarded as a telling blow to
those who contend that there is a special rule for self-serving de-
clarations. In that case, a prosecution for willfully misapplying
the moneys of a federal bank, there was an issue as to the good faith
of the accused in making overdrafts on the bank. On direct ex-
amination, the accused was asked a question intended to disclose
his offer to the president of the bank to make an immediate sale
of his real estate in order to cover the overdrafts. The circuit court
58 128 W. Va. 598, 37 S. E.2d 459 (1946).
59 The courts, however, disposed of the objection to the evidence in one
short paragraph and made no reference to the fact that, according to the
orthodox view, the evidence was hearsay. As another example of rule-of-thumb
treatment, without citation of authority, see Dickinson Fuel Co. v. Glenn Coal
Co., 103 W. Va. 366, 137 S. E. 539 (1927) (hearsay: apparently not within any
exception). See also cases referred to in note 54 supra.
60 Section 895.
81 Section 1765.
62 Although §1765 is omitted from the third and latest edition, the only
index reference to "self-serving" declarations in the 3d edition is to §1732 which
deals with the admissibility of "Statements By An Accused" under the exception
to the hearsay rule for Declarations Evidencing Physical or Mental Condition,
citing some unsound decisions excluding such self-serving declarations. However,
as already indicated in the body of this article, the pertinent West Virginia
cases admit such declarations when they come within this exception to the
hearsay rule. See Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 468, 469, 49 P.2d 649, 659 (1935),
saying there is no special rule excluding self-serving declarations.
83 See 1 JONEs, EVmENCE §235 (4th ed. 1938).
84 146 Y.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1944).
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had excluded this assertion. In 'discussing the admissibility of this
evidence, Judge Hand said:
"The prosecution seeks to defend the exclusion on the
theory that the testimony would have been 'self-serving,' and
that it was not part of the 'rcs gestae.' What else but 'self-
serving' the testimony of an accused person on his direct
examination is likely to be, we find it difficult to understand;
and as for 'res gestae,' it is a phrase which has been accountable
for so much confusion that it had best be denied any place
whatever in legal terminology; if it means anything but an
unwillingness to think at all, what it covers cannot be put in
less intelligible terms."65
The court thereupon held that the exclusion of this self-serv-
ing statement was reversible error, the evidence being admissible of
course under the orthodox hearsay exception for Declarations Evi-
dencing Physical or Mental Condition, 3 or on the theoretically
sounder ground, supported by a little authority, that the evidence
does not violate the hearsay rule at all as the declarant is now tes-
tifying on the stand, under oath and subject to cross examination,
with respect to his "extrajudicial" statement.6 7
In conclusion then, and by way of summary, what is the West
Virginia law on the question? Clearly it is not possible to reconcile
all our cases on the theory that there is a principle of evidence es-
pecially excluding extrajudicial self-serving declarations; for we
have many cases, not overruled, admitting such declarations which
either come within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule or do
not violate the rule. Moreover, as has already been noted, no clear-
cut decision has been found whose conclusion cannot be justified
merely by invoking the hearsay rule and its exceptions, or the doc-
trines dealing with situations in which the hearsay rule is not vio-
lated. It would seem to follow therefore that, notwithstanding
some judicial dicta to the contrary, the real ratio decidendi of our
cases-the sole authoritative element in the decisions-can be spell-
ed out only in terms of the hearsay rule, together with the estab-
01r At 198.
60 See 6 WVIGWORE, EVIDENCE §1732 (3d ed. 1937 Supp.), considering the
evidence in this case as coming within this exception to the hearsay rule.
67 As to the theoretical soundness of the view that such evidence does not
violate the hearsay rule at all, and as to the little authority supporting this
theory, see Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 HAiv. L. REv. 177 at 192-196 (1948). That such evidence, rightly
analyzed, is not hearsay, see Thomas v. State, 185 Md. 596, 47 A.2d 43 (1946).
The orthodox view, however, is contra. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135 (1945).
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lished exceptions and related doctrines. To adopt Dean Pound's
famous distinction between "law in books" and "law in action,""8
in West Virginia it may be law in books, according to some but not
all cases, that there is a special rule excluding self-serving declara-
tions; but in this jurisdiction the law in action-the law actually
enforced in the courts, whatever language may be used-is that the
real objection to so-called self-serving assertions is that they are
hearsay and therefore, when they are offered to prove the truth of
the facts asserted, they violate the hearsay rule; but they are admis-
sible if they come within any of the recognized exceptions or if they
do not violate the rule: by this rationale, and by this rationale only,
can our various decisions in point be harmonized and generalized
into workable principles.
68 See Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12 (1910).
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